Missouri Law Review
Volume 55
Issue 4 Fall 1990

Article 7

Fall 1990

Market Share Liability New York Style: Negligence in the Air
Mike D. Murphy

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Mike D. Murphy, Market Share Liability New York Style: Negligence in the Air, 55 MO. L. REV. (1990)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss4/7

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
bassettcw@missouri.edu.

Murphy: Murphy: Market Share Liability

Market Share Liability New York Style:
Negligence in the Air?
Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly and Co.'

In its famous PalsgrafP decision, the Court of Appeals of New York
faced the issue whether, given that a defendant acts negligently towards3
someone, this negligence gives rise to liability to an unforeseeable plaintiff.
Judge Benjamin Cardozo concluded that "[p]roof of negligence in the air, so
to speak, will not do."4 Because the defendant's conduct did not pose an
unreasonable risk of harm to the particular plaintiff, and the damage to her
was unforeseeable, the fact that the conduct was unjustifiably risky to another
was irrelevant 5
In a recent decision, the highest court of New York adopted a theory of
market share liability that strays from Cardozo's foreseeability theory. The
New York court added a new twist to "traditional" 6 market share liability and
held that a defendant could be liable even if the defendant can show that it did
not make the particular drug that injured the plaintiff. This Note evaluates the
New York approach, with particular emphasis on the consequences of holding
a defendant liable for "negligence in the air."
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly and Co. 7 consolidates four cases in which plaintiffs
alleged injury resulting from their mothers' ingestion of the drug diethylstil-

1. 73 N.Y.2d 487, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941 (1989).
2. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
3. Id. at 339, 162 N.E. at 99.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. By "traditional" market share liability the author is referring to the California
version of market share liability adopted in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d
588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). See
infra notes 35-59 and accompanying text for a full discussion of the Sindell version
of market share liability.
7. 73 N.Y.2d 487, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941 (1989).
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bestrol (DES) during pregnancy. 8 Various manufacturers of the drug were
joined as defendants in the underlying actions. 9
DES is a synthetic form of the female hormone estrogen. 0 Production
of DES is much cheaper than isolating natural estrogen.
From 1947 to
1971 the drug was marketed for human miscarriage prevention. 2 In 1971,
however, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) prohibited the use of DES
for this purpose. 13 Studies linked the use of DES with vaginal adenocarcinoma, a form of cancer, and with adenosis, a precancerous vaginal growth, in the
female offspring of DES users. 14 Because an estimated one-half to three

8. Id. at 503, 539 N.E.2d at 1071, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 943. Although not class
actions, the court stated that "these cases are representative of nearly 500 similar
actions pending in the courts in this state; the rules articulated by the court here,
therefore, must do justice and be administratively feasible in the context of this mass
litigation." Id.
9. Id. Included as defendants in the various actions were The Upjohn Co., Eli
Lilly and Co., Abbott Laboratories, E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., Rexall Drug Co., Boyle
and Co., Rorer Pharmaceutical Corp., and Merck & Co., Inc. Id. at 491-501, 539
N.E.2d at 1070-71, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 942-43.
10. Id. at 502, 539 N.E.2d at 1072, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 944. See also Sindell v.
Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 689
P.2d 368 (1984) (en banc); Fischer, ProductsLiability-An Analysis of Market Share
Liability, 34 VAND. L. REv. 1623, 1623 (1981); Comment, DES and a Proposed
Theory of EnterpriseLiability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963 (1978).
11. Schwartz & Mahshigian, Failure to Identify the Defendant in Tort Law:
Towards a Legislative Solution, 73 CAUF. L. REV. 941, 943 (1985).
12. Id. at 944. Some commentators argue that DES was actually ineffective in
preventing miscarriage. See Comment, supra note 10, at 963 n.2.
13. Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 11, at 944. DES is still used for other
purposes in the United States. See Comment, supra note 10, at 963 n.2.
14. Hymowitz 73 N.Y.2d at 503, 539 N.E.2d at 1072, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 944. See
also Fischer, supra note 10, at 1623-24; Comment, supra note 10, at 965-66. Indeed,
the PHYsIcIANs' DESK REFERENCE states:

ESTROGENS SHOULD NOT BE USED DURING PREGNANCY. The
use of female sex hormones during early pregnancy may affect the
offspring. It has been reported that females exposed in utero to diethylstilbestrol, a nonsteroidal estrogen, may have an increased risk of developing
later in life a rare form of vaginal or cervical cancer. This risk has been
estimated to be 0.14 to 1.4 per 1000 exposures. Furthermore, from 30 to
90 percent of such exposed women have been found to have vaginal
adenosis and epithelial changes of the vagina and cervix. Although these
changes are histologically benign, it is not known whether they are
precursors of malignancy..
PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 1174-75 (43d ed. 1989).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss4/7
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million women used DES during pregnancy, the potential 5 monetary damages
to users' daughters is estimated in the billions of dollars.'
Potential DES plaintiffs face a virtually impregnable bar to recovery
under traditional tort principles. 16 This bar stems from the difficulty in'
identifying a particular DES manufacturer and from the latent nature of DES
injuries. 7 It is estimated that, during the 24 years in which DES was
approved for use during pregnancy, as many as 300 companies may have
produced the drug. 8 Further, DES is a generic drug, meaning that each
manufacturer uses an identical formula in production. 9 Thus, druggists
usually fill prescriptions from whatever source is on hand.2°
The long gestation period also clouds the identification issue.2' The
Hymowitz court stated:
[M]emories fade, records are lost or destroyed, and witnesses die. Thus the
pregnant women who took DES generally never knew who produced the
drug they took, and there was no reason to attempt to discover this fact
until many years after ingestion, at which time the information is not
available.22
Because of the latent nature of DES injury, many DES cases are barred
by the statute of limitations before discovery of the injury.23 The traditional
New York rule was that "the limitations period accrued upon exposure in
actions alleging personal injury caused by toxic substances." 24 This "expo-

15. Fischer, supranote 10, at 1623-24 (citing Henderson, ProductsLiability,DES
Litigation: The Tidal Wave Approaches Shore, 3 CORP. L. REv. 143, 143 (1980)).
Potential monetary damages are likely to rise dramatically if noted plaintiff's attorney
Aaron M. Levine is successful in his quest to prove that DES causes genetic mutations.
Sherman, New DES Front, NAT'L L.J., March 12, 1990, at 1, col. 1. Mr. Levine
maintains that on about March 16, 1990 he will file a complaint alleging that DES
"genetically altered the grandchild of a woman who took the drug." Id. (emphasis
added). Apparently, thirteen-year-old Amy Roberts, whose grandmother took the drug
while pregnant with Amy's father, developed the trademark cancer of the cervix. Id.
at 26, col. 1. Mr. Levine postulates that "there are many more [such cases] to come."
Id. at 1, col. 2.
16. Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 503, 539 N.E.2d at 1072, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 944.
17. Id.
18. Id. See also Fischer, supra note 10, at 1625.
19. Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 503, 539 N.E.2d at 1072, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 944.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 503-04, 539 N.E.2d at 1072-73, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 945.
24. Id. at 503, 539 N.E.2d at 1073, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 945 (emphasis added)
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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sure rule" made it practically impossible for DES plaintiffs to recover.25 In
1986, however, the New York Legislature enacted a "discovery rule" for "the
latent effects of exposure to any substance."2 Thus, the statute of limitations
clock does not begin to tick until discovery of the injury.
While helping DES plaintiffs, this legislative action does not resolve the
identification issue. 27 In the Hymowitz cases, the defendants moved for
summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiffs could not identify the
particular manufacturer of the particular drug that purportedly injured them.2
In three of the four underlying actions the defendants also moved on statute
of limitations grounds.29 The defendants alleged that a New York statute
reviving causes of action for DES exposure for one year was unconstitutional.30 The trial court denied all motions.31 Particularly, on the statute of
limitations defense the trial court granted plaintiffs' cross motions, which
eliminated defendants' affirmative defense that the actions were timebarred.32
On appeal, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, affirmed
in all respects. It certified the following question to the court of appeals:
"whether a DES plaintiff may recover against a DES manufacturer when
identification of the producer of the specific drug that caused the injury is
impossible. 3 3 The New York Court of Appeals answered yes. It held that
a market share theory, using a national market for determining liability, was
the appropriate method for determining liability and apportioning damages in
DES cases in which identification of a particular manufacturer was impossi34
ble.

(citation omitted).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 504, 539 N.E.2d at 1073, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 945 (citation omitted).
27. Id.
28. Id.

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id. See 1986 N.Y. LAws ch. 682,,§ 4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 505, 539 N.E.2d at 1073, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 945.
Id. at 502, 512-13, 539 N.E.2d at 1072, 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 944, 950.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss4/7
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND

The seminal case on market share liability is Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories.35 The fact pattern presented to the California Supreme Court in Sindell
was very similar to that presented in Hymowitz. 36 The Sindell court stated
that generally there can be no liability without a specific showing that
defendant caused plaintiff's injuries.3" The court noted, however, this
general causation rule was not without exceptions.38 The Sindell court
proposed and adopted a new basis of liability for this situation; it based its
proposal on a modification of an existing exception to the causation rule.39
The first and most important exception examined by the California court
was the so-called "alternative liability" theory as set forth in Summers v.
Tice.4" In Summers, the plaintiff was negligently shot by one of two hunters
using identical guns and ammunition.4' Although the plaintiff could not
prove which of the two defendants actually caused his injury, the court held
the defendants jointly and severally liable.42 The defendants could, however,
escape liability by showing they could not have caused plaintiff's injury.43
The Sindell case did not find the alternative liability theory applicable because

35. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980).

See also

McCormack v. Abbott Laboratories, 617 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Mass. 1985); Smith v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 173 Ill. App. 3d 1, 527 N.E.2d 333 (1988) (both applying the Sindell
methodology). But see Tidler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 851 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(applying Maryland and D.C. law); Wood v. Eli Lilly & Co., 723 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.
Fla. 1989); Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D. S.C. 1981); Mulcahy v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67 (Iowa 1986); Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d
241 (Mo. 1984) (en banc) (refusing to adopt market share liability); Burnside v. Abbott
Laboratories, 351 Pa. Super. 264, 505 A.2d 973 (1985).
36. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 588-92, 607 P.2d at 925-28, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 132-36.
37. Id. at 597, 607 P.2d at 928, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
38. Id. at 598, 607 P.2d at 928, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
39. Id.
40. Id. (citing Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948)). See infra
notes 45-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of other exceptions.
41. Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 86, 199 P.2d 1, 4.
42. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 598-99, 607 P.2d at 928, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
43. Id; Summers, 33 Cal. 2d at 86, 199 P.2d at 4. The Summers rule is embodied
in the Restatement of Torts. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 599-600 n.11, 607 P.2d at 929 n.11,
163 Cal. Rptr. at 137 n.11; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3) (1965)
("Where the conduct of two or more actors is tortious, and it is proved that harm has

been caused to the plaintiff by only one of them, but there is uncertainty as to which
one has caused it, the burden is upon each such actor to prove that he has not caused
the harm.").
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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of the large number of DES producers and because of the long latency period
involved in DES claims. 44
The court also discussed a second exception to the traditional causation
requirement, the theory of "concert of action." 45 The Sindell court quoted the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, providing that
[f]or harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another,
one is subject to liability if he (a) does a tortious act in concert with the
other or pursuant to a common design with him, or (b) knows that the
other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance
or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself, or (c) gives substantial
assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and his own
conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third
person. 6
Because there was no evidence of an express or tacit agreement between
manufacturers to engage in tortious conduct, there was no viable cause of
action under the concerted action theory. 47
Finally, the Sindell court discussed the theory of "enterprise liability"
posited in Hall v. E.L Du Pont de Nemovis & Co., Inc.48 In Hall, several
children were injured by blasting caps. Unfortunately, the plaintiffs could not
identify the specific manufacturer of the injury-causing product. The court
imposed liability on the entire domestic blasting cap industry, which consisted
of six manufacturers. The court specifically found that those six entities
jointly controlled the risk.49 The court also focused on the parallel behavior
present in the establishment of industry wide safety standards. 50 Thus,
"under this industry-wide liability theory, the existence of industry wide
standards or practices may support a finding of joint control of risk and shift
the burden of proving identification to the defendants."51 This theory
however, has never been adopted by any other court.52
The Sindell court rejected the theory of enterprise liability, and noted that
in the Hall case there were six possible manufacturers, while in the DES

44. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 602-03, 607 P.2d at 931, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
45. Id. at 603-07, 607 P.2d at 931-33, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139-41.
46. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 876 (1965)).
47. Id. at 605-06, 607 P.2d at 932-33, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 140-41.
48. Id. at 607-10, 607 P.2d at 933-35, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 141-43 (citing Hall, 345
F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Schwartz & Mashigian, supra note 11, at 953 (citing Hall, 345 F. Supp. at
374).
52. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 607-10, 607 P.2d at 933-35, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 141-43.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss4/7
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situation there were at least 200.53 Further, the court relied on the absence
of concert of action for the proposition that defendants did not jointly control
the risk.54 Also, the drug industry is monitored by the Food and Drug
Administration; therefore, the industry standard is suggested by the government rather than by industry consensus. 55
Modifying the Summers v. Tice alternative liability theory, the California
Supreme Court adopted a new theory of market share liability.56 The Sindell
court first changed the Summers requirement that all potential defendants be
57
before the court to a requirement that a "substantial percentage" be joined.
Next, the Sindell majority held "[e]ach defendant will be held liable for the
proportion of the judgment represented by its share of that market unless it
demonstrates that it could not have made the product which caused plaintiff's
injuries."5' Thus, a defendant can exculpate itself by showing it could not
have made the injury-causing product. The court rationalized that "[u]nder
this approach, each manufacturer's liability would approximate its responsibili59
ty for the injuries caused by its own products.
The Sindell decision left open the question whether the liability imposed
would be joint and several or several only. In Brown v. Superior Court, 60
the California Supreme Court resolved this ambiguity, by providing that each
defendant's liability under market share is several only.6 1 An individual
manufacturer's liability cannot be inflated to allow for the full recovery of

53. Id. at 609, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
54. Id.
55. id.
56. Id. at 612-13, 607 P.2d at 937-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145-46.
57. Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. The court reasoned that
"[i]f plaintiff joins in the action the manufacturers of a substantial share of the DES
which [plaintiff's] mother might have taken, the injustice of shifting the burden of
proof to defendants to demonstrate that they could not have made the substance which
injured plaintiff is significantly diminished." Id. The court refused to hold that
seventy-five to eighty percent of the market was enough to constitute a "substantial
share," stating "we hold only that a substantial percentage is required." Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. The court stated that strong policy reasons favored holding defendants
liable in this situation, despite the absence of clear evidence of causation. Id. at 611,
607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144. First, and most persuasive, was the policy
cited by the court in Summers that "as between an innocent plaintiff and negligent
defendants, the latter should bear the cost of the injury." Id. Second, "defendants are
better able to bear the cost of injury resulting from the manufacture of a defective
product." Id.
60. 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 751 P.2d 470, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1988).
61. Id. at 1072-76, 751 P.2d at 485-87, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 426-28.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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plaintiffs' injuries. 62 Thus, in California liability cannot exceed a given company's market share.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted its own version of market share
liability in Collins v. Eli Lilly Co.63
It declined to follow the Sindell
approach, and held instead that "unalloyed market share theory does not
constitute the most desirable course to follow in DES cases because the
theory, while conceptually attractive, is limited in practical applicability."'"
By practical inapplicability, the court was referring to "the practical difficulty
of defining and proving market share."'
The Wisconsin approach begins with the general proposition that "[e]ach
defendant contributed to the risk of injury to the public ... [t]hus each
defendant shares, in some measure, a degree of culpability in producing or
marketing ...

a drug with possibly harmful side effects."66

Under this

approach, the plaintiff's prima facie case consists of "establish[ing] by a
preponderance of the evidence that a defendant produced or marketed the type
(e.g., color, shape, markings, size, or other identifiable characteristics) of DES
taken by the plaintiff's mother."'67
Once the plaintiff has alleged a viable cause of action, the burden of
proof shifts to the defendant "to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
it did not produce or market the subject DES either during the time period the
plaintiff was exposed to DES or in the relevant geographical market area in
which the plaintiff's mother acquired the DES."' 6 The Collins court held that
determination of liability was a jury question to be answered in the context of
Wisconsin's comparative negligence doctrine. 69 According to the court,

62. Id.
63. 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37 (1984).

64. Id. at 189, 342 N.W.2d at 48.
65. Id. The court further held that "the waste of judicial resources which would
be inherent in a second 'mini-trial' to determine market share militates against its
adoption." Id. at 190, 342 N.W.2d at 49. Note that the California court seems to have
subsequently solved this problem by adopting a national market and compiling this
national market share information. See Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 509, 539 N.W.2d at
1076, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 948.
66. Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 191-92, 342 N.W.2d at 40. The court again
rationalized that as between an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, "the latter
should bear the cost of injuries." Id. Further, "[t]he drug company is in a better
position to absorb the cost of the injury." Id. Finally, "the cost of damages awards
will act as an incentive for drug companies to test adequately the drugs they place on
the market for general medical use." Id.
67. Id. at 194, 342 N.W.2d at 50.
68. Id. at 198, 342 N.W.2d at 52. The court reasoned that defendants "will have
better access to relevant records than the plaintiff." Id.
69. Id. at 198-99, 342 N.W.2d at 53.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss4/7
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market share remains an important factor for the jury's consideration. 70 The
goal of the Wisconsin approach appears to be to allow the jury to hold a
defendant liable "in proportion to the amount of risk it created that the
plaintiff would be injured by DES. ' This risk-based approach resembles
market share liability only when a jury is allowed to consider market share in
making its assessment of the proportion of risk of injury for which a defendant
is liable.
Shortly after Collins, the Washington Supreme Court adopted another
72
version of DES market share liability in Martin v. Abbott Laboratories.
The Washington version, styled "market share alternative liability," claims
justification in that "[e]ach defendant contributed to the risk of injury to the
public and, consequently, the risk of injury to individual plaintiffs." 73 The
Washington court did leave defendants an out: "Individual defendants are
entitled to exculpate themselves from liability by establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that they did not produce or market the... DES taken
by plaintiff's mother . . .74
An interesting aspect of the Washington methodology is that defendants
who fail to exculpate themselves are "presumed to have equal shares of the
market and are liable for only the percentage of plaintiff's judgment that

70. Id. The court stated that
[i]n assigning a percentage of liability to each defendant, the jury may
consider factors which include, but are not limited to, the following:
whether the drug company conducted tests on DES for safety and efficacy
in use for pregnancies; to what degree the company took a role in gaining
FDA approval of DES for use in pregnancies; whether the company had a
small or largemarket sharein the relevant area;whether the company took
the lead or merely followed the lead of others in producing or marketing
DES; whether the company issued warnings about the dangers of DES;
whether the company produced or marketed DES after it knew or should
have known of the possible hazards DES presented to the public; and
whether the company took any affirmative steps to reduce the risk of injury
to the public.
Id. (emphasis added).
71. Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 510, 539 N.E.2d at 1076, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 948.
72. 102 Wash. 2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984) (en bane). See also Note, Into the
Quagmire: Washington Adopts Market Share Liability in DES Cases, 21 GONZ. L.
REV. 198 (1985); Note, Where a Plaintiff Cannot Identify Which Drug Company
Manufactured the DES Ingested, a Cause of Action Exists Under the Market Share
Alternative Theory of Liability, 55 Miss. L.J. 195 (1985).
73. Martin, 102 Wash. 2d, at 604, 689 P.2d at 382. See also Hymowitz, 73
N.Y.2d at 511, 539 N.E.2d at 1077, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 949.
74. Martin, 102 Wash. 2d at 605, 689 P.2d at 382.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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represents their presumptive share of the market." 75 A defendant may rebut
this presumption by introducing evidence to establish respective market
share.76 If proven, a particular defendant is liable only for the percentage of
the total judgment corresponding to the company's market share.77 The
liability of unexculpated defendants, however, is inflated to allow for a 100%
recovery.78
The Washington Supreme Court further developed its theory in George
v. Parke-Davis,79 a subsequent DES decision. First, the determination of
market share is a question of fact in each case.80 Second, depending on the
circumstances of a particular case, the relevant market may be as small as the
local pharmacy or as large as the country.81 The court stated "the relevant
market for determining liability [should] be as narrow as possible."82

75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 606, 689 P.2d at 383.
78. Id. The Martin court provided the following hypotheticals to illustrate the
theory's application:
Assume that plaintiff's damages are $100,000 and defendants X and Y
remain subject to liability after exculpation by other named defendants. If
neither establishes its market share then they are presumed to have equal
shares of the market and are liable respectively for 50 percent of the total
judgment, X, $50,000 and Y, $50,000. Assume defendant X establishes
that it occupies 20 percent of the relevant market, and defendant Y fails to
prove its market share. Defendant X is then liable for 20 percent of the
damages, or $20,000, and defendant Y is subject to the remaining 80
percent, or $80,000. Assume that defendant X establishes a market share
of 20 percent and defendant Y a 60 percent market share. Then defendant
X is subject to 20 percent of the judgment, $20,000, and defendant Y to 60
percent of the judgment, $60,000. The plaintiff does not recover her entire
judgment because the remaining 20 percent of the market share is the
responsibility of unnamed defendants.
Id.
79. 107 Wash. 2d 584, 733 P.2d 507 (1987) (en banc). See also Hymowitz, 73
N.Y.2d at 511, 539 N.E.2d at 1077, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 949.
80. George, 107 Wash. 2d at 593, 733 P.2d at 512.
81. Id. See Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 11, at 954-64 (comparing the
various versions of market share liability).
82. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss4/7
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III. THE INSTANT DECISION
A. Rejection of Accepted Tort Doctrines
Judge Wachtler, author of the majority opinion, began by rejecting the
established tort doctrines of alternative liability and concerted action:83 He
stated "we agree with the near unanimous views of the high [s]tate courts that
have considered the matter that these doctrines in their unaltered common-law
forms do not permit recovery in DES cases."84
Relying on Summers v. Tice,8" the Hymowitz court stated the rule of
alternative liability as "where two defendants breach a duty to the plaintiff, but
there is uncertainty regarding which one caused the injury, 'the burden is upon
each such actor to prove that he has not caused the harm." '86 The court
stated that "the central rationale for shifting the burden of proof in such a
situation is that without this device both defendants will be silent, and plaintiff
will not recover; with alternative liability, however, defendants will be forced
to speak, and reveal the culpable party, or else be held jointly and severally
87
liable themselves.
The court postulated that in order to invoke the doctrine of alternative
liability, the defendant must have better access to information than the
8
plaintiff, and all possible tortfeasors should be joined in the action. 8
Further, the court stated "alternative liability rests on the notion that where
there is a small number of possible wrongdoers, all of whom breached a duty
to the plaintiff, the likelihood that any one of them injured the plaintiff is
relatively high, so that forcing them to exonerate themselves, or be held liable,

is not unfair.,

89

83. Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.S.2d at 505, 539 N.E.2d at 1073, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 945-46.
See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132
(1980); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37 (1984); Martin v.
Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984) (en banc).
84. Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 505, 539 N.E.2d at 1073, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 945.
85. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948). See infra notes 40-44 and accompanying
text for a discussion of alternative liability.
86. Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.S.2d at 505, 539 N.W.2d at 1074, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 946
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3) (1965)).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 505-06, 539 N.E.2d at 1074, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 946 (citing Summers v.
Tice, 33 Cal. 2d at 86, 199 P.2d at 1; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433(B),
comment h (1965)).
89. Id. at 506, 539 N.E.2d at 1074, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 946 (citing Sindell, 26 Cal.
3d at 603, 607 P.2d at 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 132).
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The Hymowitz court ultimately held the large number of potential
tortfeasors and the long time period between ingestion and injury created
problems for this traditional tort theory. 90 Defendants did not have the
requisite better access to information, and it was virtually impossible to have
all possible producers before the court.91 The court seized also on the issue
of fairness, holding "while it may be fair to employ alternative liability in
cases involving only a small number of potential wrongdoers, that fairness
disappears with the decreasing probability that any one of the defendants
actually caused the injury."9
In DES litigation the chance a particular
93
defendant actually caused the injury in question is often very remote.
Therefore, alternative liability provides no relief.94
Next, the court dealt with the theory of concerted action. 95 Analogizing
to drag racing cases, it stated the theory "provides for joint and several
liability on the part of all defendants having an understanding, express or tacit,
'
to participate in 'a common plan or design to commit a tortious act. 06
The court conceded the drug companies had engaged in parallel conduct
in producing DES from an identical formula. 7 There was, however, no
evidence of any agreement to market DES in an unsafe manner.9" The court
concluded "[p]arallel activity, without more, is insufficient to establish the
'
agreement element necessary to maintain a concerted action claim."9
Although the traditional common law doctrine provided plaintiffs with no
relief in Hymowitz, the court rationalized that "judicial action is ... required
to overcome the 'inordinately difficult problems of proof' caused by
contemporary products and marketing techniques."''1
Thus, the court
opened the door for the imposition of market share liability.

90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. (citing W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 46 (5th ed,
1984)).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. (citing Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 605, 607 P.2d at 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 140;
Collins, 116 Wisc. 2d at 185, 342 N.W.2d at 46; Martin, 102 Wash. 2d at 599, 689
P.2d at 379).
100. Id. at 507, 539 N.E.2d at 1075, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 947 (citing Bichler v. Eli
Lilly and Co., 55 N.Y.2d 571, 579-80, 436 N.E.2d 182, 185, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776, 779
(1982)).
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B. Market Share Liability
In looking to non-traditional forms of relief, the Hymowitz court stressed
that in the DES situation, "it is more appropriate that the loss be borne by
those that produced the drug for use during pregnancy, rather than by those
who were injured by the use, even where the precise manufacturer of the drug
action."1 °1 Policies of fairness and
cannot be identified in a particular
1 02

justice mandated judicial relief.

First, the court had to deal with its previous DES decision in Bichler v.
Some commentators interpreted Bichler to create a
Eli Lilly & Co.103
modified form of the concerted action doctrine.'O' In Bichler, the court
submitted jury instructions substituting "conscious parallel activity by
manufacturers" for the traditional common law requirement that a plaintiff
prove "actual or tacit agreement to participate in a common plan to commit
tortious behavior."105 Because of the defendant's failure to object, "the
modified
concerted action theory became the law applicable to that particular
106
case."
The Hymowitz court, however, refused to adopt this modified concerted
action theory as the general law of the state.'0 7 It held
inferring agreement from the fact of parallel activity alone improperly
expands the concept of concerted action beyond a rational or fair limit;
among other things, it potentially renders small manufacturers, in the case
of DES and in countless other industries, jointly liable for all damages
stemming from the defective products of an entire industry.l1u

101. Id.
102. Id. The court also focused on the expectations created by the New York
Legislature's revival of hundreds of DES cases. Id. See supra notes 24-32 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the New York statute of limitations as it relates
to DES claims.
103. 55 N.Y.2d 571, 436 N.E.2d 182, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1982). See Note, An
Improper Use of ConsciousParallelism as Evidence of ConcertedAction, 62 B.U.L.

REv.633 (1982).
104. See, e.g., Jacob, Of Causation in Science and Law: Consequences of the
Erosion of Safeguards, 40 Bus. LAw. 1229, 1238 n.29 (1985).

105. Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 508, 539 N.E.2d at 1076, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 948
(citing Bichler, 55 N.Y.2d at 584, 436 N.E.2d at 188, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 781).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 508-09, 539 N.E.2d at 1076, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 948.
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Parallel behavior is too common in modern industry to warrant the imposition
of liability.'0 9
Finally, the Hymowitz court turned to the concept of market share liability." ° After examining the various forms of market share liability adopted
in other jurisdictions, the court posed its own solution."' Relying primarily
upon California's experience, the court concluded "a market share theory,
based upon a national market," provided the practical solution.1 2 The court
explicitly rejected the Wisconsin "assessment of risk" approach, finding this
methodology would prove too burdensome and inconsistent over the long
3
run."
The court realized the adoption of a market share liability theory using
a national market would probably result in a disparity between an individual
manufacturer's liability and the actual injuries caused by that manufacturer in
New York.14 Thus, the Hymowitz policy differs from the Sindell policy.
Liability is not expected to correspond with causation over the long run of
cases. ' 5 Further, the court recognized that the use of a national market
would not necessarily result in liability in proportion to the risk created by a
defendant towards a particular plaintiff." 6 The Hymowitz court chose "to
apportion liability so as to correspond to the overall culpability of each
defendant, measured by 7the amount of risk of injury each defendant created
to the public-at-large.""
C. The "New Twist"
In contrast to previous versions of market share liability, the Hynowitz
court refused to excuse a defendant from liability upon a showing that it could
not possibly have manufactured the particular drug which injured the
plaintiff."8 The court stated that "because liability here is based on the
over-all risk produced, and not causation in a single case, there should be no
exculpation of the defendant who, although a member of the market producing

109. Id. at 508, 539 N.E.2d at 1076, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 948.
110. Id. at 509, 539 N.E.2d at 1076, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 948.
111. Id. at 509-11, 539 N.E.2d 1076-78, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 948-50.

112. Id. at 511, 539 N.E.2d at 1077, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 949.
113. Id. at 511, 539 N.E.2d at 1077-78, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 949-50.
114.. Id. at 511-12, 539 N.E.2d at 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
115. Id.
116. Id. This differs from the propositions of the Wisconsin and Washington
versions of market share liability.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 512, 539 N.E.2d at 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
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DES for pregnancy use, appears not to have caused a particular plaintiff's
injury."' " The majority rationalized that "[i]t is merely a windfall for a
producer to escape liability solely because it manufactured a more identifiable
pill, or sold only to certain drug stores. These fortuities in no way diminish
the culpability of a defendant for marketing the product, which is the basis of
liability here." 20 The majority did concede that a defendant could not be
held liable if it did not make DES for use during pregnancy."'
Finally, the Hymowitz court found DES producers severally liable, not
jointly and severally liable as had other jurisdictions.12 Liability "should
not be inflated when all participants in the market are not before the court in
a particular case.I' 23 The court realized its rule would result in some
plaintiffs failing to recover their total damages.124 The court explained that
because it refused to allow a defendant exculpation from liability, it would not
be fair to "increase a defendant's liability beyond its fair share of responsibility.,,1125
D. Judge Mollen's Opinion"

Judge Mollen concurred in two of the underlying cases and dissented in
part in the remaining two. 127 Mollen agreed with the majority that market
share liability based on a national market was the proper theory for the
plaintiffs to pursue.'2 He would, however, allow exculpation of a defendant
who could prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it did not

119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. The court, however, noted that in this case no defendants had established
that they were not in the national market of DES for pregnancy use. Id. at n.2.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 513, 539 N.E.2d at 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
125. Id. The majority explained in a footnote that one reason why they refused
to adopt a theory of concerted action was because the theory requires joint and several
liability, thus placing an unfair burden on small manufacturers. Id. at n.3. The
majority concluded its opinion with a discussion of the constitutionality of New York's
revival statute, ultimately finding that it was constitutional. Id. at 513-16, 539 N.E.2d
at 1079-80, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 951-52.
126. Judge Mollen was sitting by designation, pursuant to the N.Y. CONST., art.
VI, § 2 (1977). Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 516, 539 N.E.2d at 1080, 541 N.Y.S.2d at
952.
127. Id. at 516, 539 N.E.2d at 1080, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 952.
128. Id. He also agreed that the New York revival statute was constitutional. Id.
at 516, 539 N.E.2d at 1081, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 952.
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manufacture the particular pill taken by the plaintiff's mother.129 Further,
he would allow joint and several liability in order to ensure that a particular
plaintiff obtains full relief.13 0
Judge Mollen noted that in the California, Wisconsin, and Washington
approaches, a defendant could exculpate itself by proving it could not have
made the specific drug taken 6y the plaintiff.13 ' He realized "to preclude
exculpation would directly and unnecessarily contravene the established
common-law tort principles of causation." 3 7 Mollen contended the majority
"provide[s] DES plaintiffs with an unprecedented strict liability cause of
action." 33 He maintained the majority's rationale is "unfair and inequitable"
to those defendants who could prove they did not manufacture the drug in
question. 34 In Mollen's opinion, the majority was merely adopting the
Bichler "modified concerted action" theory which they explicitly purported to
reject in their opinion. 35
Judge Mollen appears to embrace the Sindell approach. He advocates
the shifting of the burden of proof on the issue of causation to the
defendants and [he] would impose liability upon all of the defendants who
produced and marketed DES for pregnancy purposes, except those who
136
were able*to prove that their product could not have caused the injury.
Judge Mollen further advocates imposing joint and several liability on
those defendants who are unable to exculpate themselves. 37
Mollen's
version of market share liability differs from Sindell in this respect. 138 Joint
and several liability ensures plaintiffs a full recovery for their injuries.139

129. Id. at 516, 539 N.E.2d at 1081, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 953.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 519,539 N.E.2d at 1082, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 954. See supra notes 35-82
and accompanying text for a discussion of the California, Wisconsin, and Washington
approaches to market share liability.
132. Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 519, 539 N.E.2d at 1082, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 954
(citations omitted).
133. Id. at 520, 539 N.E.2d at 1083, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 955.
134. Id.
135. Id. See supra notes 103-109 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Bichler "modified concerted action" theory.
136. Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 521, 539 N.E.2d at 1083, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 955.
Thus, Mollen would let two defendants off the hook in the underlying actions because,
to him, these defendants proved that they could not have manufactured the pill taken
by the plaintiff. Id. at 523, 539 N.E.2d at 1085, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 957.
137. Id. at 523, 539 N.E.2d at 1085, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 957.
138. See supra notes 60-62.
139. Id.
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This procedure also provides defendants with an incentive to implead DES
manufacturers not joined by the plaintiff.'" This opportunity reduces
Mollen claims this approach furthers
unfairness to innocent defendants.4
the "valid public policy of imposing the burden of bearing the cost of severe
injuries upon those who are responsible for placing into the stream of
commerce the causative instrumentality of such injuries.' 4' Finally, Judge
Mollen concludes the majority engages in judicial legislation by eliminatinh
fundamental causation requirements. 143

IV. COMMENT
This Note uses the policy behind tort law and products liability as a
framework for analysis. This policy framework warrants a terse review.
Further, the Note examines attempts to expand market share liability outside
the DES arena, and evaluates a potential legislative solution.
A. Policy Framework
Compensation' 44 and deterrence' 45 are the two most widely announced purposes underlying tort law. Other frequently mentioned purposes
are the assessment of moral blame in the eyes of society,'" and the punishment of wrongdoers. 47 A major purpose of the cause in fact requirement
in tort law is to limit the scope of potential liability.'4 Professor David
Fischer writes that the "cause-in-fact requirement is one way in which the law

140. Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 522, 539 N.E.2d at 1084,541 N.Y.S.2d at 956.
141. Id.
142. Id. Mollen analogizes to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to illustrate the
proposition that his suggested methodology is not a radical departure from traditional
doctrines of tort law. Id.
143. Id.
144. W. PROSSER AND W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 4 (5th ed. 1984); J.
HENDERSON, JR. AND R. PEARSON, THE TORTS PROcEss 34 (2d ed. 1981); see also
Special Committee on the Tort Liability System, Towards a Jurispendence ofInjury:
The Continuing Creation of a System of Substantive Justice in American Tort Law,
REPORT TO THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 4-1, 4-29 to 4-41 (1984).

145. W. PROSSER AND W. KEETON, supra note 144, at 25; J. HENDERSON, JR.
AND R. PEARSON, supra note 144, at 33; Special Committee, supra note 144, at 4-3.
146. W. PROSSER AND W. KEETON, supra note 144, at 21. See also Fischer,
supra note 10, at 1638-39.
147. J. HENDERSON, JR. AND R. PEARSON, supra note 144, at 33; Special
Committee, supra note 144, at 4-170.
148. Fischer, supra note 10, at 1629 (citing W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS 236-37 (4th ed. 1971)).
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limits the scope of liability and attempts to avoid discouraging socially
desireable activity."' 49
There are six generally recognized goals of a strict products liability
regime.' " These goals include (1) compensation (or loss spreading); (2)
deterrence; (3) encouraging useful conduct; (4) overcoming proof problems;
15
(5) protection of consumer expectations; and (6) cost internalization. 1
The compensation goal is based on the premise that in our modern
society injuries to individual consumers caused by the use of complex
products are inevitable.15 1 Because of the gravity of potential injury, it is
fair to impose liability on the manufacturers of these products who can, in
turn, shift the loss back to consumers via price increases or insurance.'
The deterrence goal rests on the proposition that the threat of liability
motivates manufacturers to make safer products.154
Strict liability is
believed to be a stronger deterrent than negligence. 55 Under a negligence
standard a manufacturer is held to a reasonable person benchmark, while the
strict liability standard may require a manufacturer to go beyond this
reasonable person 5 criterion
if the cost of added safety is less than the cost of
6
potential liability.

The third goal, and perhaps the most important for purposes of analyzing
the New York version of market share liability, is encouraging useful
conduct. 5 7 The deterrence and compensation goals nearly always indicate
liability.'5" Yet, until the New York version of market share liability:
no court has imposed the liability of an insurer on manufacturers by
requiring them to pay for all harm caused by their products. This is
because of the fear that such absolute liability would place unreasonable
burdens on manufacturers and discourage them from producing useful

149. Id. (citing W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 237, 239 (4th
ed. 1971)).
150. D. FISCHER & W.
MATERIALS 50-51 (1988).

POWERS,

JR.,

PRODucrs

LIABILITY

CASES AND

151. Id.
152. Id. at 50 (citing Holford, The Limits of Strict Liability for ProductDesign
and Manufacture, 52 TEX. L. REV. 81, 82-84, 87-88 (1973); Wade, On the Nature of
Strict Liabilityfor Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 826 (1973)).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. (citing Epstein, ProductsLiability: The Search for the Middle Ground,
56 N.C.L. REv. 643 (1978); Fischer, supra note 10, at 1628-29 (1981); Klemme, The
EnterpriseLiability Theory of Torts, 47 U. COLO. L. REv. 153 (1976)).

158. Id.
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products. The policy of avoiding over-deterrence by balancing the needs
of defendants against needs of plaintiff is clearly at work, although it is
seldom articulated. 5 9
The fourth goal of products liability law is to help plaintiffs overcome
difficult proof problems.' 6 Often the defendant is in a much better position
than an individual plaintiff to prove fault or lack of fault. 161 Some
commentators conclude that the market share liability theory reflects "courts'
policy judgment that as between an innocent plaintiff and defendants who are
allegedly guilty of some wrongful conduct, the plaintiff should prevail-even
established) conduct in question did not cause
if the alleged (not necessarily
'

.the plaintiff's injury. 62 In products liability actions courts often simplify

the plaintiff's primafacie case or shift the burden of proof on an issue to the
defendant.' 63
The final two commonly articulated goals of product liability law include
the protection of consumer expectationsf 64 and the policy of cost internalization.'65 The consumer expectation policy is grounded in the notion that
manufacturers induce consumers to rely on safe products, thus the consumer
should be protected from hidden perils."6 The cost internalization goal
depends on manufacturers passing liability costs back to consumers, who can
then make intelligent purchases based upon the true costs of products.' 67

159. Id.
160. Id. at 50-51 (citing Keeton, ProductLiability and the Meaning of Defect, 5
ST. MARY'S L.J. 30, 34-35 (1973); Schwartz, Foreword: Understanding Products
Liability, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 435, 459-61 (1979)).
161. Id.
162. Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 11, at 942.
163. D. FISCHER & W. POWERS, JR., supra note 150, at 51.
164. Id. (citing Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection:
Doctrine,Function and Legal Liability for ProductDisappointment,60 VA. L. REV.

1109 (1974)).
165. Id. (citing Franklin, Tort Liability for Hepatitis: An Analysis and a
Proposal,24 STAN. L. REV. 439, 462-63, 465-72 (1972); Katz, The Function of Tort
Liability in Technology Assessment, 38 U. CIN. L. REV. 587, 636, 662 (1969)).
166. Id.
167. Id. See also Owen, Rethinking the Policiesof Strict.ProductsLiability, 33
VAND. L. REV. 681 (1980); Powers, DistinguishingBetween Products and Services in
Strict Liability, 62 N.C.L. REV. 415, 423-28 (1984) (discussing these policies).
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B. Policy Implications of New York's Version
of Market Share Liability
The traditional tort requirement of causation in fact fails to further tort
goals of deterrence and compensation.' 6 Professor Fischer provides the
following illustration:
[S]uppose a falling tree that had been struck by lightning injured plaintiff.
If plaintiff were able to establish that a railroad company was negligent in
failing to equip its locomotive with a whistle, a court could further the tort
policies of compensation and deterrence by imposing liability for plaintiff's
injury upon the railroad company, even though no causal connection existed
between the company's negligence and plaintiff's injury. As long as the
railroad company understood that liability was being imposed upon it
because of its negligence, it would have an incentive to equip its locomotives properly in the future. At the same time, requiring the railroad
company to compensate the injured party would further society's interest in
169
compensating accident victims.
Thus, market share liability fails to profoundly effect these goals.
The goal of assessing moral blame flounders in the context of "traditional" market share liability. 70 The plaintiff may not have even joined the
culpable defendant.' 7 ' This problem is magnified under the New York
theory, where there certainly will be cases where a defendant could exculpate
itself if given an opportunity. The policy of assessing moral blame is further
watered down as courts decrease the threshold of "substantial market share"

168. Fischer, supra note 10, at 1628. See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the goals of deterrence and compensation applied in both a
traditional tort context and in a products liability context. The punishment goal is also
unaffected by market share liability.
169. Fischer, supra note 10, at 1628 (citing Klemme, The EnterpriseLiability
Theory of Torts, 47 U. COLO. L. REv. 153, 163-65 (1976)). Strict liability is based
on three factors: causation, defect, and injury. See Comment, supra note 10, at 991.
If causation is taken away, as under the New York theory of market share liability,
plaintiff then arguably only has to show defect and injury. The absurdity of this result
is readily apparent. In DES cases, however, this issue is probably irrelevant because
the law tends to set a negligence standard when the defective product is a drug. Id.
at 967, 967-68 n.18; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A Comment
k (1965). This does, however, manifest the danger in applying market share liability
outside the DES arena. See infra notes 184-203 and accompanying text for a
discussion of efforts to apply market share liability outside the DES context.
170. Fischer, supra note 10, at 1639. By "traditional" market share liability, the
author is referring to the Sindell variety.
171. Id.
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This problem is intensified if market
below the ninety percent level.172
share is expanded to industries which, unlike the DES market, are not
concentrated in a relatively few firms.17 3
Perhaps the most profound policy effect of market share liability
transpires in the area of encouraging useful conduct, 74 or avoiding overdeterrence.'75 The consequences of over-deterrence include disincentives for
safety to unsafe manufacturers, and a reluctance by "leading edge" companies
to introduce new products for fear of potential liability. "By apportioning
damages throughout an industry solely on the basis of market shares and
irrespective of safety efforts, it enables unsafe manufacturers to spread the
burden of their accident costs and thereby creates disincentives for safety." 176 Further,
[i]t has also been pointed out that imposing the market-share theory in a
strict liability tort case 'gives rise to a form of absolute liability by relieving
the plaintiff of proving defendant's breach of duty and by guaranteeing
plaintiff's proof of causation,' which 'forces an industry into the position
of an insurer' of a product. 77
In reflecting on the over-deterrence issue, liability expert Peter Huber
asks and answers the question "[w]ho fled most quickly from the baying tort
pack? Those quickest on their feet, of course-the person of action, the
company of initiative, the mover, the shaker, and the doer." 178 In characterizing the damper placed on innovation by excessive tort liability, he states "in
the very markets where the legal pursuit was the most intense ...the mood

172. As the threshold percentage for establishing market share liability is
decreased, the probability of actually joining the culpable defendant also decreases.
Thus, the moral blame policy weakens.
173. Fischer, supra note 10, at 1639.
174. See supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
175. See, e.g., Fischer, supra note 10, at 1629 ("[I]f a defendant's potential
liability is excessive, then its useful conduct might be inhibited along with its
undesirable behavior.").
176. Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 11, at 960. See also Mahoney &
Littlejohn, Innovationon Trial: PunitiveDamagesVersus New Products,246 SCIENCE
1395, 1395 (1989) ("Because a high level of legal uncertainty and scientific innovation
cannot coexist, new, safe products may be kept off the market and the scope of
research and development restricted.").
177. Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 11, at 960 (citing Note, The Market
Share Theory: Sindell's Contribution to Industry-Wide Liability, 19 Hous. L. REV.
107, 135-36 (1981)).
178. P. HUBER, LIABILITY-THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

155 (1988).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990

21

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 4 [1990], Art. 7

1068

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

among suppliers
became most sullen, hostile, defensive, and then coldly
1 79
stagnant.'
As an example, Huber states "[r]esearch expenditures by U.S. companies
working on contraceptives peaked in 1973 and plummeted 90% percent in the
next decade." 18° Huber quotes the president of a major pharmaceutical
company, reflecting on the amount of litigation and asking "[w]ho in his right
mind would work on a product today that would be used by pregnant
women?"'8 Society suffers because "[i]t is the innovative and unfamiliar
that is most likely to be condemned." '
Empirical evidence on the over-deterrence effect is difficult to find.
According to one author, "[t]he inquiry is enormous because virtually every
corner of society has been reached by the liability revolution, and frustrating
because each story is unique, with much of the evidence anecdotal in nature
and hard to document or quantify." 18 3 In the pharmaceutical industry, much
of the evidence that is available centers around the highly visible areas of
contraception and vaccines. It is safe to say, however, that the number of
product liability lawsuits filed in the U.S. is increasing at a staggering rate.
Between 1974 and 1988 the number of product liability lawsuits filed in
federal district courts increased by 983 percent.'"
Because of the limited availability of concrete evidence, it becomes
necessary to infer over-deterrence from certain market characteristics. For
instance,
[i]n 1980, experts writing in InternationalFamily Planning Perspectives
predicted that 'long-acting hormonal rings, vaginal rings, new injectable
preparations, postaglandins to induce early abortions, IUDs causing less
bleeding and pain, and cervical caps are in advanced field trials with
thousands of women, and should be widely available [in the contraceptive
industry] within the next three to five years.'18

179. Id.
180. Id. (citing Carson-Parker, The Liability Crisis: Who's At Risk, CHIEF
EXECUTIVE 19 (Summer 1986)). As a further example of the effect of over-deterrence,
Huber states that "[b]etween 1965 and 1985, the number of U.S. vaccine manufacturers
shrank by more than half; by 1986 the nation depended on a single supplier for
vaccines against polio, rubella, measles, mumps, and rabies.... And only two major
companies ... were still investing heavily in vaccine research." Id. at 156.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Olson, Overdeterrence and the Problem of Comparative Risk, 37 NEW
DIEcnoNs IN LIABIUTY L. 42, 43 (1988)).
184. Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, Issue: Product Liability Reform

(1988).
185. Current Issue, A ContractualSolution to the Contraceptive Crisis, 8 YALE
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Though some of these products are now available in Europe, nine years later
'
A plausible explanation for the
not one is available in the U.S."186
availability of the drugs in Europe and not in the United States is the liability
crisis.
C. Attempts to Expand Market Share Liability
Outside the DES Arena
Courts limit the doctrine of market share liability to DES cases.
Innovative plaintiffs attorneys, however, diligently attempt to apply market
of actual attempts at
share liability outside the DES context. Examples
8
expansion range from vaccines187 to asbestos' 8 and even to a ruptured

The Sindell court implied that "[t]he market share
breast prosthesis.'8
theory... conceivably could apply to all potentially harmful fungible
products made from an identical formula."' 9 Thus, market share liability
could conceivably embrace "the manufacturing and marketing of cigarettes, 9' food additives, 92 generic drugs, 3 asbestos,'94 pesticides,'9

L. & POL. REV. 101, 108 (unpublished as of 3-3-90) (citing Atkinson, Schearer,
Harkavy & Lincoln, Prospectsfor Improved Contraception,INT'L FAM. PLAN. PERSP.
43 (June 1980) (emphasis added)).
186. Id. (citation omitted).
187. See, e.g., Sheffield v. Eli Lilly & Co., 144 Cal. App. 3d 583, 592-99, 192

Cal. Rptr. 870, 875-80 (1983) (defective polio vaccine).
188. See, e.g., Thompson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 714 F.2d 581 (5th Cir.

1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1102 (1984); Hannon v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 567 F.
Supp. 90, 92-93 (E.D. La. 1983); Starling v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 533 F. Supp.

183, 186-91 (S.D. Ga. 1982).
189. See Lee v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 721 F. Supp. 89 (D. Md. 1989), aff'd,
898 F.2d 146 (4th Cir. 1990).
190. Fischer, supra note 10, at 1652 (citing Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 610, 607 P.2d
924, 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 144, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980)); Birnbaum,
Market Share Liability Under California'sSindell DES Decision, NAT'L L.J., May

19, 1980, at 27, col. 2.
191. Fischer, supra note 10, at 1652 (citing Note, Industry-Wide Liability, 13
SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 980, 1002 (1979); Note, Manufacturers'Liability Based on a
Market Share Theory: Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,16 TULSA L.J. 286, 301 n.81

(1980)).
192. Id. (citing Note, supra note 191, at 1002; Note, supra note 191, at 301 n.82).

193. Id.
194. Id. (citing Comment, supra note 10, at 974 n.36; Note, Industry-Wide
Liability and Market Share Allocation of Damages, 15 GA. L. REv. 423, 425 n.10
(1981); Note, supra note 191, at 301 n.82; Note, 49 U. CIN. L. REV. 926, 934 n.63

(1980)).
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aluminum wire,1' industrial waste, 197 and products that cause environmental pollution."'198 Fortunately, at this juncture attempts at expansion fail.
A recent New Jersey case illustrates careful reasoning by a court in
refusing to expand market share liability. In Shackil v. Lederle Laboratories,"9 the plaintiffs filed a medical malpractice and products liability action
arising out of the 1972 inoculation of an infant plaintiff with what is
commonly known as the DPT vaccine. 2' The plaintiffs could not identify
20 1
the specific manufacturer, so attempted to invoke market share liability.
In refusing to accept the theory, the court rationalized that the imposition of
market share liability would frustrate public policy and public health
considerations by "threatening the continued availability of needed drugs and
impairing the prospects of the development of safer vaccines. 20 2 The court
also paid heed to the fact that recent market trends threatened the supply of
DPT and that due to extreme liability exposure there were only two current
producers of the drug.20 3 While the Shackil court found no liability, it
addresses the potential problems inherent in imposing too much liability on
an industry as vital to our health and welfare as the drug industry.

D. Legislative Question
Some commentators suggest a legislative or administrative compensation
plan when injured persons cannot identify the specific manufacturer responsible.2" Suggested alternatives include:
(1) a limited no-fault product liability fund for plaintiffs unable to
identify the manufacturer of a generic product that produced a
latent injury;

195. Id. (citing Comment, supra note 10, at 974-75 n.36; Note, supra note 191,
at 301 n.82).
196. Id. (citing Note, supra note 194, at 934 n.63).
197. Id. (citing Note, supra note 191, at 1002).
198. Id. (citing Note, supra note 191, at 1002; Note, supra note 188, at 475; Note,
supra note 191, at 301 n.82).
199. 116 N.J. 155, 561 A.2d 511 (1989).
200. Id. at 156, 561 A.2d at 512.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 167, 561 A.2d at 523.
204. Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 11, at 964-75. These alternatives stem
from market share liability's "wake [of] extraordinary legal costs, delay, injustice, and
the imposition of tort law liability on a party who is, in fact, not responsible for
plaintiff's harm." Id. at 942.
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suits against the federal agency responsible for regulating the
particular industry using the Federal Tort Claims Act and the
Administrative Procedure Act;
ad hoc congressional responses to mass injuries caused by
products of unidentifiable manufacturers;
legislation designed to hold certain industries liable through trade
associations for all injuries caused by those industries' products
whenever the manufacturer of an injury-causing product is not
identifiable;
a no-fault compensation system for persons injured by DES
which would be funded by a tax imposed upon all manufacturers
who produced DES for use as a miscarriage preventative; and
a toxic tort compensation system not limited to a single industry
or a single type of product-injury but designed to deal with the
205
toxic tort problem as a whole.

Schwartz and Mahshigian suggest a particularly appealing legislative
solution which grasps the following general principles:
(1)
(2)

(3)

(4)

the tort system should guide recovery when a particular defendant can be identified;2 '
in non-identification cases, the claimant should be required to
show fault, causation, damages, and a good-faith, genuine
attempt to identify the manufacturer;2
legislation should penalize plaintiffs and counsel who falsely
identify a defendant ...including defendant's legal costs and a
possible civil fine; 2rs
the legislation should strongly emphasize causation-that the
product actually caused plaintiff's injury; 209 and

205. Id. at 966. See Bichel, DES Litigation and the Problem of Causation,51
INS. COUNS. J. 223 (1984); Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relaxation of Cause-in-Fact
Rules for IndeterminatePlaintiffs, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 881 (1982); Downey & Gulley,
Theories of Recovery for DES Damage: Is Tort Liability the Answer?, 4 J. LEGAL
MED. 167 (1983); Fischer, supra note 10; Roberts & Royster, DES and the Identification Problem, 16 AKRON L. REV. 447 (1983); Comment, Industry Wide Liability:
Solving the Mystery of the MissingManufacturerinProductsLiabilityLaw, 38 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 139 (1983); Note, Industry-Wide Liability, 13 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 980
(1979); Note, Market ShareLiability:A Plea forLegislativeAlternatives, 1982 U. ILL.
L. REv. 1003 (suggesting alternative systems of recovery).
206. Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 11, at 967.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
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(5) damages should be limited to the claimant's true excess econom210
ic losses, which means no damages for pain and suffering.
Specific provisions of the Schwartz and Mahshigian plan remedy many
problems cited in this Note. First, this scheme places the burden of proof on
the defendant only when information is in the defendant's control.211
Second, the plan provides that all manufacturers of DES should contribute to
compensation paid to plaintiffs, calling this provision "fairer than the random
targeting of defendants that occurs under current judicial theories." 212 Third,
payment by the individual manufacturers "further[s] the cause of effective
213
deterrence of (and where appropriate, penalty for) tortious behavior."
Fourth, a properly applied legislative solution would lower the administration
costs of the present tort system. Finally, limiting recovery to economic
damages lessens the burden on manufacturers. This relief conceivably inures
to the benefit of society in the form of lowered prices and increased
innovation.
Another attractive legislative solution is the adoption of a federal
products liability statute that pays more credence to FDA approval. An
Institute of Medicine study recently advocated that, as a general matter, there
be no liability for design defect or inadequate warning if the FDA has
reviewed and approved the contraceptive product or the warning and has
addressed the characteristics of the product that caused the plaintiff's injury.
The defense should not be available if the manufacturer withheld relevant
information from the FDA in the approval process or if information developed
after approval was not reviewed by the FDA for the purpose of determining
whether the product or its labeling should be changed. 1
The added certainty which a uniform statute provides would allow
manufacturers to divert more funds into the research and development area,
and would allow the introduction of innovative new products without fear of
excessive liability.
V. CONCLUSION

Looked at from a societal perspective, market share liability fails horribly.
It merely perpetuates the overall liability crisis in America. Society suffers

210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id. at 968.
Id. at 969-70.
Id. at 970.
Id. at 970-71.
Committee on Contraceptive Development, DevelopingNew Contraceptives:

Obstaclesand Opportunities, Institute of Medicine 143 (1990).
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from increased prices, decreased safety, and a reluctance to market beneficial
new products. This crisis begs for a return to traditional tort theory.
The New York version of market share liability assumes a perfect world.
It requires uniformity to meet its initial goal of averaging. Thus, it only
"works" if all fifty states apply the same rationale. Absent uniformity it
becomes grossly unfair to defendants. Given that at least six states explicitly
reject market share liability, and that only a half dozen others adopt the
theory, the prospect of uniformity is slim. Therefore, if one buys into the
market share concept, the only way to assure perfect compliance is through
comprehensive federal legislation.
The Hymowitz decision allows "offensive" use of market share liability
even when the defendant DES manufacturer can prove that it absolutely did
not manufacture the particular drug taken by the plaintiff. Extending this
logic to its natural conclusion, perhaps a defendant should be able to use
market share "defensively" when the plaintiff can identify the culpable
manufacturer. Thus, a defendant marketing five percent of the DES produced
for use during pregnancy would only be liable for five percent of plaintiff's
damages even when identified as the culpable party. The overall 'liability of
a particular defendant would then coincide perfectly with culpability. To hold
otherwise "transform[s] the market share liability theory into a lottery based
on the fortuity of the availability of evidence in a particular case. 21 5 The
outcome, of course, is absurd.
MIKE D. MURPHY

215. Fischer, supra note 10, at 1643.
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